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BIBLICAL ATONEMENT AND MODERN
CRIMINAL LAW*
Jerome Hall**
The organization of a Section on Law and Religion in 1976 by
the Association of American Law Schools (after Watergate) was fol-
lowed in 1977 by the incorporation of the Council on Religion and
Law. My participation in both led to the study of theology and es-
pecially to the question, what, if anything, can a legal scholar, par-
ticularly one specialized in penal law and the philosophy of law,
contribute to the literature on the interrelations of law and religion?
In the English-speaking world not many legal scholars have written
on this subject, and none, to my knowledge, on the interrelationship
of religion and modem criminal law.' I here confine my discussion
to the Bible and, more particularly, to some of the writing on atone-
ment by Christian theologians.
The central focus of Christianity is on the crucifixion and resur-
rection of Jesus Christ, and the relevant theme, originating in the
Old Testament and frequently addressed in the New Testament, is
that of atonement. Both the Old Testament and the New Testament
accept and emphasize the vicarious significance of the sacrifice-the
lamb in the Old Testament, Jesus in the New Testament. The one
sacrificed takes on itself or himself the sins of Israel or the sins of all
mankind. Likewise, the sacrifice frees all Israel or all mankind from
sin, and the consequence is reconciliation with God.
But modem ethics, especially Kantian, and modern penal law
reject both connotations of Biblical atonement and the relevant the-
ology. In modern penal law, for example, one is responsible only
for his own crimes, not for those of his wife or brother. So, too, no
substitute for the criminal will be punished. The offer of a father to
go to prison instead of his convicted son's doing so would be irrele-
vant, and is hardly conceivable in modem penal law. Hence, the
principal problem: Is there a sharp conflict between religion on the
* This article was published in Japan in a Festschrft for Justice Shigemitsu Dando
upon his retirement from the Supreme Court of Japan.
** Jerome Hall, LLD. (h.c.) Tubingen University 1978, is Professor of Law at the Uni-
versity of California's Hastings College of the Law. He is a past president of the American
Society for Political and Legal Philosophy, a member of the China Academy, Honorary
Director of the Korean Law Center, and a Director of The Council on Religion and Laws.
1. See J. HALL, LAW, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CRITICAL THEORY, chs. 1 and 2 (1982).
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one side and law and ethics on the other? Or, since one must distin-
guish religious faith from knowledge of positive law and morality,
are the two realms compatible?
There have been innumerable interpretations of atonement but
for the present purpose they may be divided into two types or
classes-the legal interpretation and the antilegal interpretation pos-
ited solely on God's love. Not that the legal interpreters did not
appreciate God's love; that would be inconceivable in any Christian
theologian. But they also recognized the "wrath of God," his hatred
of evil, and his frequent threats to impose harsh sanctions. 2 For ob-
vious reasons, I shall be particularly interested in the legal interpre-
tation, for it is there that we find both the direct influence of law on
religion and theology, and the influence of religion through its theo-
logical view of atonement on penal law. There are many statements
in the Old Testament that express or imply one or more of the ideas
that define "atonement." "And Aaron shall offer the bull, as a sin
offering for himself, and shall make atonement for himself and for
his house. . . .and shall lay both his hands upon the head of the
goat and send him away into the wilderness . . . and make atone-
ment for himself and for the people." (Lev. 16:6, 21, 24).
One thousand years separate the authors of the earliest books
in the Old Testament from the later prophets who spoke of God not
as jealous or hating but as a loving father and merciful judge. In-
deed, it is in Isaiah 53 where one finds the later expression of atone-
ment to which Christian theologians constantly refer and rely on as
prophetic of the coming of Jesus as Messiah. "He was despised and
rejected by men. . . .Surely he has borne our griefs and carried our
sorrows. . . .He was wounded for our transgressions .. .upon
him was the chastisement that made us whole, and with his stripes
we are healed. . . .He bore the sins of many, and made interces-
sion for the transgressors."
In the New Testament, Jesus, the perfect man-God, "died for
the ungodly;" (Rom. 5:6) "while we were enemies we were recon-
ciled to God by the death of his Son. . . ." (Rom. 5:10) "Then as
one man's (Adam's) trespass led to condemnation for all men, so
one man's act of righteousness leads to acquittal and life for all
men." (Rom. 5:18, also Heb. 7:25). "By his wounds you have been
healed." (1 Peter 2:24; also Col. 1:14). "This was to fulfill what was
2. This simplification of the difference between the principal types of interpretation
will be more fully elucidated in the following discussion.
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spoken by the prophet Isaiah ... " (Matt. 8:17). "Christ redeemed
us from the curse of the law ... " (Gal. 3:13). "Behold, the Lamb
of God, who takes away the sin of the world." (John 1:29).
What have the theologians whose interpretations have been
called "legal" said about these passages in the Bible? Tertullian (c.
155A.D.-230A.D.), one of the most erudite of the Church fathers,
was said by some to be a Roman lawyer and he was even identified,
probably mistakenly, with the jurist Tertullianus. In any case, the
schools in Carthage, where Tertullian studied, taught rhetoric, law
and philosophy, and every educated Carthaginian knew a great deal
of the dominant Roman law.3
Certainly Tertullian's treatises bear the unmistakable marks of
a legal mind. His Apology Against the Heathen4 is a lawyer's brief
criticizing Roman procedure in the trial of Christians. Tertullian
spoke of "God's wrath" and his "eternal penalties."5 His central
terms--debt, satisfaction, compensation, guilt-have obvious legal
connotations. Hu emphasized man's duty to make "satisfaction to
God by repenting of his sins."'7 "How foolish, moreover, how (un-
just) . . . not to pay the price (repentance) and yet to stretch forth
the hand for the merchandise- For at this price the Lord hath de-
termined to grant His forgiveness. ' Repentance was "satisfac-
tion,"9  appeasement of the wrath of God and avoidance of
punishment. 10 "God sitteth over us as a Judge to exact and to main-
tain that righteousness . . . and with a view to this establisheth the
entire sum of His law. . ... I
One derives Tertullian's legal interpretation of the atonement
by bringing together relevant statements in several of his essays. It
3. ". . (Tertullian) displays a thorough and (it is claimed) profound knowledge of
Roman Law." (T. BARNES, TERTULLIAN 23 (1971) citing Beck, Romisches Recht Bei Ter-
tullian and Cyprian (1930)). "Secondly, knowledge of Roman law was not the exclusive
prerogative ofiuris consulti. It was a necessity for advocates pleading cases in court and also
a normal possession of the educated man." Id. at 24.
4. TERTULLIAN, APOLOGETIC AND PRACTICAL TREATISESpublishedin 10 LIBRARY OF
FATHERS OF THE HOLY CATHOLIC CHURCH 6-12 (1854).
5. Id. at 146, 366.
6. "The old Roman law conception appears . ..in Tertullian's portrayal of God as
Judge and in his teaching that the relationship of man to Him is pre-eminently that of a
criminal his judge." J. MORGAN, THE IMPORTANCE OF TERTULLIAN IN THE DEVELOPMENT
OF CHRISTIAN DOGMA 54 (1928). For examples of Tertullian's use of other legal terms, see
MORGAN, id. at 64-76.
7. TERTULLIAN, supra note 4, at 358.
8. Id. at 359.
9. Id. at 370.
10. Id. at 371.
11. Id. at 353.
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was Anselm who provided the classic legal interpretation in a sys-
tematic, tight, logical discussion-the renowned Cur Deus Homo 12
He was born in 1033 (d. 1109) in Piedmont and studied law in Pa-
via. His thought reveals the influence of the feudalism of his time,
of Lombard law and the Church's penitentials. "[T]o sin,"' he said,
"is nothing other than not to render to God what is due."' 3 "What
is the debt which we owe to God? Whoever does not pay to God
this honor due Him dishonors Him and removes from Him what
belongs to Him. .. .4"I "Indeed God's wrath is nothing other than
his will to punish."' 5 Repayment for the dishonor is not sufficient
unless "in proportion to the injury caused by the dishonoring, he
makes some restitution which is acceptable to the one whom he has
dishonored. Satisfaction ought to be proportional to the measure of
the sin."16 When earthly rules "rightly exercise retribution, the Lord
Himself does it; for they have been ordained by Him to this end."' 7
It follows inexorably that either the dishonor of God is "repaid" or
there will be punishment.'" Thus, in the end, God cannot be
dishonored.
The next step in Anselm's argument is that no man, indeed, not
even all human beings, can make sufficient satisfaction since all men
are sinners. Christ was a logical necessity since the required satis-
faction can only be paid by someone who is sinless. Sin calls for
payment "greater than any existing thing besides God. . . .There-
fore only God can make this satisfaction."' 9 But since man ought to
make this satisfaction and since only God can make it, "it is neces-
sary that a man-God make it."2
The logic of this argument is evident in its successive steps-
God's honor, the sinner's disobedience, God's wrath, the need for
satisfaction, and the inability of sinners to justify sinners-hence the
Virgin birth and the incarnation of the man-God who pays the price
and effects the reconciliation.2' In later discussions of the atone-
12. 3 ANSELM OF CANTERBURY (J. Hopkins, H. Richardson, trans., 1976).
13. Id. at 67.
14. Id. at 68.
15. Id. at 55.
16. Id. at 55.
17. Id. at 69.
18. Id. at 71.
19. Id. at 102.
20. Id.
21. See Anselm's essay, The Virgin Conception and Original Sin, id. at 143. The influ-
ence of ancient Greek mythology and metaphysics on Christology is beyond the scope of
this paper.
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ment there are variations from the rigor of Anselm's treatise, but
Why God Became Man set the parameters of those discussions
whether pro or con the legal interpretation.
Calvin (1509-1564) studied law at Orleans and Bourges; hence
it is not surprising that he praised law as God's commands "that he
might lift their minds higher. ' 22 Law also admonishes, is a neces-
sary deterrent 23 "and urges them on in well-doing. ' 24 "The law
shows the righteousness of God .... *"25 He anticipated Jhering
and Fuller: ". . . if the forms of the law be separated from its end,
one must condemn it as vanity. ' 26 Calvin wrote of "God's fearful
vengeance against the whole of mankind. ' 27 But God, while not
ceasing to love his children, is "wondrously angry toward them...
he would frighten them . . . to humble their fleshly pride, .. and
arouse them to repentance. 28 Although "They who .. .provoke
his wrath . . . will not escape his vengeance,29 ". . .it is not, prop-
erly speaking, punishment or vengeance, but correction and admo-
nition. '3° A secular judge "applies the penalty to the crime itself.
But when a father . . . corrects his son, he does not do this to take
vengeance on him or to maltreat him but rather to teach
him. .. "31
"The whole human race perished" because of Adam's disobedi-
ence.32 "This is our acquittal: the guilt that held us liable for pun-
ishment has been transferred to the head of the Son of God. 3 3
... God's judgment was satisfied by that price."34 Calvin writes
of Jesus' sacrifice as "his act of expiation" to "appease the father's
righteous wrath."35 Jesus' "pleading, ' 36 his intercession as man's
22. J. CALVIN, Institution of the Christian Religion, 20 LIBRARY OF CHRISTIAN CLASSICS
349 (J.T. McNeill ed. 1960).
23. Id. at 358-59.
24. Id. at 360.
25. Id. at 354.
26. Id. at 349.
27. Id. at 244-45.
28. Id. at 577.
29. Id. at 573.
30. Id. at 659.
31. Id.
32. Id. at 340. "In the dogma that the whole human race is condemned on account of
the sin of its first parents, the doctrine of collective responsibility has reached its pitch."
WESTERMARCK, I THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS 50-51 (1917).
33. Calvin, supra n.22, at 509, 510.
34. Id. at 531.
35. Id. at 467.
36. Id. at 502.
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advocate, brings "our acquittal, ' 37 "[T]he curse . . . was transferred
to him . . . (who) clothed us with his purity. '38
Opposition to legal interpretation of atonement, based in part
on Clement and Abelard, was eloquently expressed by Bushnell, an
American clergyman, in 1874. 39 Bushnell argued that Jesus did not
suffer for justice but in self-sacrifice. It dishonors God, indeed it
implies that he is immoral, to say that he "accepts the pains of the
good in payment of the pains of the bad."' 40 The legal interpretation
of atonement describes "a coarse commercial transaction."' 4' Law is
defective, first, because it is penal and does not bring about reform
by free choice. And, second, it is negative in its prohibitions.42
Bushnell uses the model of the family and the school; the mother or
the teacher corrects out of love. Their correction is "not judicially
penal. . . for it is not graded by the desert of actions, but by what is
wanted for the future benefit and due correction of the actors. ' 43 It
is not "a substantive measure of their ill-desert."44
Bushnell thought there was "no such thing" as "a penalty unde-
served." Moreover, there is no "common measure" in undeserved
penalties and deserved ones. 45 It is contrary to the spirit of the New
Testament to list a set of "vocables" as substitutes for penalty, com-
pensation, transferable merits, sins carried over, sins accepted for
the sinner and so on. These "theological counters" and "computa-
tions of atonement" are "to any Christian believer" a "very sad af-
fair," not "altogether spurious," but "artificial. ' 46 In even stronger
terms a contemporary theologian wrote: "To speak as if the Son
. . . appeased or propitiated God. . . is blasphemy. 47
In a similar vein, the philosopher-theologian, H. Rashdall, crit-
ical of every aspect of the legal interpretation, argued that Jesus'
death could help others only in the way that the acts of other right-
eous persons could help others-by their example, stimulating be-
37. Id. at 509.
38. Id. at 510.
39. H. BUSHNELL, FORGIVENESS AND LAW (1874). See Rashdall, The Abelardiun Doc-
trine of the Atonement, in DOCTRINE AND DEVELOPMENT 128 (1898).
40. Bushnell, supra n.39, at 86.
41. Id. at 91.
42. Id. at 109.
43. Id. at 134.
44. Id. at 135. Bushnell says "the word justice does not occur once in the New Testa-
ment. ... Id. at 141.
45. Id. at 143-44.
46. Id. at 95.
47. F. DILLISTONE, THE CHRISTIAN UNDERSTANDING OF ATONEMENT 244 (1968).
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nevolence. 48 He also rejected the view that Christ's death was a
ransom paid to the Devil or to God 9.4  "God is a loving Father who
will pardon sin upon the sole condition of true repentance." 5 He
seeks reconciliation, or at-one-ment. Tertullian's theory is "coars-
ened and legalized,"' "poisoned by the substitution of legal for
moral conceptions."5 2 To Rashdall, Anselm employed Lombard
conceptions of civil law-satisfaction, debt and Wergild.5 3 His "no-
tions of justice are the barbaric ideas of an ancient Lombard king or
the technicalities of a Lombard lawyer. . . .- Most interesting is
Rashdall's rejection of "the attribution of guilt to all humanity for
the sin of one, nor can the payment of a penalty by the sinless Christ
rationally or morally be considered to make any easier or any juster
the remission of the penalty which man owes for his own sin."55
"We have no right to pronounce just in God what would have
seemed the highest injustice among men. "56
Rashdall strikes his heaviest blow on the retributive theory of
punishment. That theory, he states, is implied in the emphasis on
expiation and penalty in all legal interpretations of atonement. It is
"a survival of primitive modes of thought . . . it cannot be rational
to inflict an evil except as a means to good-the good of the offender
or of others." It is inconsistent with the Christian ethic of love and
the character of God. "Even on the retributive view of punishment
it is impossible to defend the punishment of the innocent in place of
the guilty."57
In his recent book58 Hans Kung, a Catholic theologian, adds
some surprising innovations in his criticism of the legal interpreta-
tions of the atonement. For him God is "wholly love."59 Conspicu-
ously omitted from his Index are the terms "penance,"
"punishment," "wrath of God" and "hell."'60 After listing the "ju-
48. H. RASHDALL, THE IDEA OF ATONEMENT IN CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY 35 (1919).
49. Cf Mark 10:43-45; Matthew 20:26-28.
50. RASHDALL, supra note 48, at 48.
51. Id. at 249.
52. Id. at 253.
53. Id. at 351-52.
54. Id. at 355.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 356.
57. Id. at 422.
58. H. KUNG, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN (E. Quinn, trans., 1976).
59. Id. at 435.
60. Jesus often threatened hell, everlasting fire and "gnashing of teeth." Matthew 5:22,
30; 8:12; 11; 23; 13; 42; 18:8, 9. "Wrath of god" is a frequent expression in the New Testa-
ment, Matthew 3:7; Romans 1:18; Ephesians 5:6.
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ridical concepts" used in legal interpretations-"law, guilt, penalty,
reward, penance, expiation, ransom, satisfaction, reconciliation, res-
titution,"'" he characterizes those interpretations as "a re-Judaizing
process in the name of Christiantity."6 2 More surprising is his state-
ment that the idea of original inherited sin, upon which the necessity
of the God-man's intercession depends, "seems problematic."63 He
rejects the theory of redemption on which the legal interpretation
rests because it is legalistic, based on Roman law, "legal niceties"
and human justice, not on the "grace, mercy and love" characteristic
of the New Testament.64 He even rejects "sacrifice" emphasized in
the legal interpretation. "Is God so cruel, even sadistic, that his an-
ger can be appeased only by the blood of his Son?" Instead of "sac-
rifice," Kung would substitute "voluntary personal self-surrender"
..."self-giving. '65 Instead of "expiatory sacrifice," Kung offers
"reconciliation, representation, redehiption, liberation. '6 6  For
Kung, "God loves sinners more than the righteous. ' 67 "He forgives
instead of condemming, liberates instead of punishing, permits the
unrestricted rule of grace instead of law. . . .The God who prefers
the sinner. . . the prostitutes and adulterers to their judges, the law-
breakers and outlaws to the guardians of the law."' 68 "He is a God
who lavishes his grace on those who do not deserve it."' 69 "He is not
a God of law, but a God of grace."7
The distinguished theologian, Emil Brunner, provides a de-
tailed refutation of the anti-legalist interpretations of the atone-
ment.7' They err, he argues, in thinking that the only alternative to
Anselm is the "wholly subjective" view that "the death of Jesus was
61. KUNG, supra note 58, at 421.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 422.
64. Id. at 423. Similarly, "It [redemption] is...an outstanding example of a legal no-
tion being taken up and made into a religous notion by priests and prophets." D. DAUBE,
STUDIES IN BIBLICAL LAW 42 (1947).
65. Kung, supra note 58, at 424-25. KUNG omits any reference to Jesus' first words on
the cross-the first line of Psalm 22.
66. KUNG, supra note 58, at 426.
67. Id. at 274. Kung's italics.
68. Id. at 313.
69. Id. at 435. Tillich has echoed this: "...justice is the structural form of love with-
out which it would be sheer sentimentality .. .there are no conflicts in God between his
reconciling love and his retributive justice." P. TILLICH, 2 SYSTEMATIC THEOLOGY 174
(1957).
70. KUNG, supra note 58, at 314. "Thus the law is an enemy .... The Divine Love
cannot be imprisoned in the categories of merit and of justice. G. AULEN, CHRISTUS
VICTOR 68 (A. Herbent trans. 1966).
71. E. BRUNNER, THE MEDIATOR (0. Wyon trans. 1934).
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a sublime and noble martyrdom. 72 Their most serious defect is
that they trivialize guilt. "If the Cross merely denotes the removal
of a religious error (namely, that God is not an angry Judge) then
guilt is not taken seriously, '73 Moreover, if "guilt is merely error,
and God is nothing but love, there is no need for forgiveness; . . .
all you need is to know it."
74
"Divine punishment also issues necessarily from the Holiness
of God,' 75 but at the same time there is "the overwhelming reality
of forgiving love."' 76 "That God can be both at once, the One who
'is not mocked,' and the One who 'doth not deal with us after our
transgressions,' that neither aspect is sacrificed to the other . . . this
fundamental theme of the whole Bible is the message of the
Cross. . . ."7 Accordingly, although Jesus' Passion is not a pen-
alty, certainly not a transaction, "it is a sacrifice, a vicarious action"
in which Jesus identified himself wholly with the human race.78
Instead of deprecating law, Brunner eulogizes it. "The law is
the manifested Will of the Lord God. . . . All order, all signifi-
cance, all beauty, all trustworthiness, all constancy, all fidelity and
all faith, all truth and all good, are based. . . upon the Law, which
constitutes the intrinsic content of His Will. . .. ,,79 "[This law] de-
mands the divine reaction, the divine concern about sin, the divine
resistance to this rebellion, and this breach of order. . . . If this
were not true there would be no seriousness in the world at all; there
would be no meaning in anything, no order, no stability . . . chaos
and desolation would be supreme."" The Bible is "full of such ju-
ridical expressions . . . guilt, remission of guilt, judgment, judge,
punishment, accusation, condemnation, pardon, release .. ."81
I leave it to the reader to choose which, if any, interpretation of
biblical atonement he prefers. The problem discussed here is an in-
terdisciplinary one based on certain interrelations of law and reli-
gion. More narrowly, it is focused on the legal interpretation of
72. Id. at 439.
73. Id. at 471.
74. Id. at 472.
75. Id. at 464.
76. Id. at 449.
77. Id. at 452.
78. Id. at 495.
79. Id. at 461.
80. Id. at 444.
81. Id. at 465.
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atonement and especially on the opposition of vicarious and indi-
vidual responsibility.
Pervading all of these problems is that of interpretation itself-
what the theologians call exegesis or hermeneutics. A Christian the-
ologian will interpret Isaiah 53, indeed most of the Old Testament,
as prophetic of the coming of Christ while a Jewish theologian will
provide a very different interpretation of that Testament, including
Isaiah 53. So, too, Kung's negative view of Hinduism and Bud-
dhism is far different from that of adherents to those world religions.
Just as lawyers are influenced by their clients' interest and interpret
statutes in conformity with that given end, so does a theologian's
conception of God determine his interpretation of a religious text.
Just as lawyers pick and choose among the cases so do theologians
select those biblical passages that support their ordained goal. In
the practice of law, however, subjectivity is diminished by the ad-
versary system either directly as in the Anglo-American system or
indirectly as in the civil law systems and, also, in both, by the impar-
tiality of the judge.82
Certain other generalizations regarding the interpretations of
biblical atonement may be ventured. First, both legalists and anti-
legalists agree that Jesus bore all men's sins. But the reasons differ
widely-from a belief in orthodox Christology to the simple belief
that Jesus identified with all suffering, sinful humanity. 3
Second, both sides seem to agree that Jesus' life, if not his cruci-
fixion, was necessary for the salvation of sinful humanity, although
again "necessary" is given different interpretations ranging from ac-
ceptance of orthodox views of original sin and the incarnation to the
inspiration of his life "unto death."
Third, the legalists praise law and retributive justice, while the
anti-legalists criticize and condemn both. For the former, law, far
from being a burden,84 represents God's communication of his
righteousness, his guidance, and his loving chastisement to lead peo-
82. See J. HALL, Religion, Law and Ethics, in LAW, SOCIAL SCIENCE AND CRIMINAL
THEORY (1982).
83. In Judaism "atonement... is effected through suffering by the individual himself.
This is where Judaism and other religious systems differ most widely from Christianity,
which does not think of atonement as affected by man's effort or suffering. . . . Christianity
met [this problem] with its Christology." O.S. RANKIN, ISRAEL'S WISDOM LITERATURE 122
(1954 reprint of 1936). See I. al Farqi, Islum, in THE GREAT ASIAN RELIGIONS 312 (W.
Chan ed. 1969).
84. Psalm 19. See A. BUCHLER, STUDIES IN SIN AND ATONEMENT (Intro. by F.C.
Grant, 1967).
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pie away from evil and toward goodness. For the anti-legalists, ac-
ceptance of law even as a minimum standard turns quickly to
criticism of law as "legalistic" and, in any case, as far inferior to
God's loving grace. The parallel of that with Plato's criticism of law
in The Statesman and his preference for the justice and wisdom of
the philosopher-king are striking. Equally significant are the bibli-
cal foundations of the perennial debates between deontologists and
utilitarians regarding punishment.
We can better understand atonement vis-a-vis present-day
problems of penal law if we first take a backward glance at the place
of collective responsibility and retribution in past ages. Only then
can we appreciate the fact that our ancestors were not irrational in
their penology. Moreover, that history is a necessary prolegomenon
to a realistic grasp of present problems, for in that wider perspective
we may discover not only that the past can guide us toward feasible
reforms but also that it imposes limits on utopian plans to uproot
retributive justice.
From the perspectives of sociology and modern penal law col-
lective responsibility seems superstitious and based on the myth that
a society is a great ego, a person separate from the interactions of
individuals; and it is outrageous from an ethical viewpoint since it
imposes punitive sanctions on innocent persons. But history reveals
interesting relevant facts. First, in pre-industrial societies, both an-
cient and modern, social groups are so closely knit in intimate con-
tact and association (whose unity was symbolized in the leadership
of a chief or ruler) that it is the most natural thing in the world to
think not of or as an individual but, instead, to think in concepts of
the family, the clan, the community, or the nation. Only with indus-
trialization and the loosening of ties does individualism make its
appearance. Accordingly, we should distinguish present-day socio-
logical conceptions of the group from the corporate idea that domi-
nated biblical times."
But, secondly, it has become clear that there was not simple
unilinear evolution starting solely from the idea of corporate re-
sponsibility and ending in the substitution of the ethic of individual
responsibility. From ancient times, moral leaders, including drama-
85. See H. ROBINSON, THE HEBREW CONCEPTION OF CORPORATE PERSONALITY
(1964). In the thought of ancient Israel "sin was more than guilt; it was pollution. It in-
fected the whole neighborhood . . . his city, his tribe or nation, and also their cattle and
crops." F. Grant, Prolegomenon, in A. BUCHLER, STUDIES IN SIN AND ATONEMENT XXI,
XXVII (1967).
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tists of ancient Greece, limited corporate liability by insisting that
the innocent should not be punished for crimes committed by
others. Moreover, as we shall see, although the pendulum has
swung far from collective to individual liability, corporate liability is
by no means completely absent in contemporary society, even from
present-day law. It was usually the prophets who spoke of the na-
tion's blessings and its liability. But Jeremiah and Ezekiel (Ez. 18)
were among the first to criticize collective liability, especially the
punishment of innocent persons for the sins of others. 6 It is also
noteworthy that in many cases when God punished the nation, it
was not for its sin but because of the ruler's sin; the king was the
"owner" of the people.87 Still, collective thinking was dominant.
Westermarck cites literally hundreds of examples of collective
responsibility among the ancient Greeks, Hebrews, Christians, Japa-
nese, Koreans, Persians, Hindus and Teutons as well as among
many primitive peoples.88 He also gives instances of the rejection of
collective liability.89 Sin was regarded as a contagious disease which
could be transferred to others and spread like an epidemic.90 This
led to the ritual of "transferring" the sins of the people to the sacri-
ficed animal or the human sacrifice. 91
Because collective responsibility means strict liability, the pun-
ishment of innocent persons, it is abhorrent to the modern mind. As
Kant put it, penal liability is not "transmissible . . . like a financial
indebtedness. . . only the culprit can bear [punishment] which no
innocent person can assume even though he be magnanimous
86. 0. Rankin, surpa note 83 at 53-54, 70. Recent studies by anthropologists support
the view expressed in the Bible, namely, that individual responsibility was sometimes advo-
cated along with collective responsibility. One anthropologist even says: "In fact, individ-
ual responsibility always exists inside corporate groups." In the pre-industrial societies
which this anthropologist studied, collective responsibility was manifested in relation to
other groups, that is, when a member of group A killed a member of group B. MOORE, THE
ALLOCATION OF RESPONSIBILITY 100 (M. Glickman ed. 1972). See T. ELIAS, THE NATURE
OF AFRICAN CUSTOMARY LAW 134 (1956).
87. D. Daube, supra note 64, at 162-63.
88. E. WESTERMARCK, 1 THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE MORAL IDEAS 32,
Ch. 2 and 19 (1917); L. HOBHOUSE, MORALS IN EVOLUTION 70-104 (1916); POLLOCK,
MAITLAND, I HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 678 (1923).
89. "for another's sin let me not suffer." RIG-VEDA ii, 28; 29; Westermarck, supra note
88, at 49. See, Deuteronomy 24:16 and 2 Kings 14:6.
90. Westermarck, supra note 88, at 61.
91. Id. at 63. Quoting Frazer: The victim must be a "representative of the community
. . . .accepted as a substitute on the principle of social solidarity," Id. at 67-68. See D.
BROWNING, ATONEMENT AND PSYCHOTHERAPY (1966).
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enough to wish to take it upon himself for the sake of another. 92
Nevertheless, the universality of collective responsibility in past
ages, the group mind-set rather than individualism (although allevi-
ated from early times by pleas to spare the innocent), the likelihood
that a deterrence was also advanced by the threat to punish a
wrongdoer's family, clan or nation-these and other factors de-
scribed above made acceptance of the concept of collective responsi-
bility natural and normal.
There is another phase of social experience that must be consid-
ered if we are to understand biblical atonement, namely, the role of
the hero in history. If "society," viewed either as the aggregate of
individuals or as a separate holistic entity, can be harmed (e.g. in
ways that distinguish crimes from civil damages) 3 it is also true that
society benefits from the sacrifice and contributions of its heroes-
its great religious and moral leaders, its artists, scientists and schol-
ars. All through history people have identified with and sung the
praises of great men and women. Indeed, Carlyle hardly exagger-
ated when he included "Hero Worship" in the title of his book
since, for him, "Universal History, the history of what man has ac-
complished in this world, is at bottom the History of the Great
Men. .. .
A more circumspect study of heroes emphasizes "the vicarious
gratification of the [people's] yearnings through his presumed traits
and achievements." 95 Krishna took human form when the need to
overcome unrighteousness became urgent, Buddha's compassion
went out to all suffering humanity, and many heroes in Ancient
Greece were believed to be the sons of gods or goddesses. Nor is it
only the great who elicit praise and gratitude. Many soldiers have
sacrificed their lives that their comrades might live, and countless
other "ordinary" persons never mentioned in the history books
make daily sacrifices that others may benefit. It is in this perspective
that versions of the atonement emphasizing Jesus identification with
all troubled, rejected men and women have great proximity to the
experience of gratitude and love that people have felt for their
92. I. Kant, Religion Within The Lights ofReason A/one 66 (T. Greene, H. Hudson trans.
1934).
93. See J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 240-246 (1960).
94. T. CARLYLE, HEROES, HERO WORSHIP AND THE HEROIC IN HISTORY 1 (1840).
"Such great teachers are very few in the world .... They alone can carry us to the life
divine." R. SRIVASTAVA, COMPARATIVE RELIGION 241 (1974).
95. S. HOOK, THE HERO IN HISTORY 22 (1943).
279]
JOURNAL OF LAW & RELIGION
heroes.96
If we combine reverance for the hero and the gratitude and af-
fection he or she inspires-if we join that to normal acceptance of
collective responsibility especially in past ages, it is no great leap
from that platform to Biblical atonement in both its connotations-
bearing the sins of others and the consequent benefit to the sinners.
The above experience is projected into a religious faith.
My concern here, however, is not theological, but secular, 97 es-
pecially with the interactions of law and religion. Indeed, positive
law and religion are so intertwined, both in the Bible and in the
Qur'an, that it is no exaggeration to speak of the legal component of
religion, of law in religion. There is no better evidence of that than
the writing of the theologians who for centuries advocated legal in-
terpretations of atonement.
If we glance at our present situation we find that some of the
relevant concepts are still operative. Samuel Johnson said: "No
man is thought the worse of here, whose brother was hanged. 98
But humanists are rare, and who can doubt that the families of some
convicted criminals are often ostracized and suffer other discrimina-
tions? In wartime hostages are taken or killed, prisoners in a con-
centration camp are held responsible for the conduct of all the
prisoners, and teachers penalize an entire class for the misbehavior
of one student, especially if he does not confess.
There is strict vicarious liability in modem legal systems when
an innocent employer is fined because of his employee's misconduct.
Innocent stockholders pay the fines assessed against the corporation
and they also benefit from most actions of the managers.99 In inter-
national relations, political leaders may provoke wars, and innocent
lives are lost. Thus, collective responsibility remains very much
alive. Much of it, perhaps most of it, does not fall within the precise
meaning of "crime," "criminal law" or "punishment;" this, indeed,
96. Compare Kant regarding the "superhuman." "[H]is distance from the natural man
would then be so infinitely great that such a divine person could no longer be held up as an
example of him. Man would say: If I too had a perfectly holy will all temptations to evil
would of themselves be thwarted in me. . .I too should take upon myself not only willingly
but joyfully all sorrows . . . even to the most ignominious death, since I would see before
my eyes the glorious and imminent sequel." Kant, supra note 92, at 57-58.
97. For my support and defense of religious faith see supra note 1, at 16-26.
98. Daube, supra note 64, at 188.
99. H. MANNHEIM, GROUP PROBLEMS IN CRIMINAL PUNISHMENT 43 (1955) distin-
guishes strict liability from that imposed on members of a union or partnership by reliance
on the act of members in joining those associations. But surely the act of one who buys
stock or joins a union is a very slender reed on which to rest punitive sanctions.
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has been said by many scholars about strict penal liability. But the
liability of associations, social sanctions, and the work of social
agencies are important aspects of the wider context in which modern
systems of criminal law can be placed to the advance of knowledge
of that law.
There is a final problem to be confronted which raises the most
insistent of all the issues. Following precedent, we have been saying
thus far that the legal interpretation of atonement was influenced by
Roman or Lombard or feudal law. But if we press beyond those
indubitable legal factors, if we seek the cause of many of their penal
provisions, we find at the bottom of them-retribution. The usual
description of the evolution and progress of retribution seems per-
suasive. First came instinctive retaliation against aggression. Sec-
ond, comes vengeance which is supported by social norms, 00 and is
limited by a sense of equivalance and reciprocity, as in barter. Fi-
nally, there emerges a principle of retribution which is refined over
the years until it becomes the retributive justice that moral philoso-
phers espouse.
The Bible and the history of theology reveal the outlines of the
perennial battle between those who would punish sinners and
criminals because they were intentional wrongdoers and those who
would deter or reform them. They also reveal the commingling of
retributive and utilitarian concepts. The sinner deserves to be pun-
ished, and punishment will also deter potential sinners; but most of
all the Bible teaches that what is paramount is the reform of wrong-
doers, i.e., reconciliation with God, resulting from repentance, resti-
tution, and forgiveness.
In modern times the issues have been cast in sharper, mutually
exclusive terms. At the one extreme is Kant's scorn of the crass util-
itarianism that defends punishment only because it would deter
others. For him, every human being should be treated as an end in
himself, not as a means to extrinsic objectives. Desert is the only
justification for punishing anyone. At the other extreme is Henry
Sidgwick, the eminent moral philosopher, who wrote that he had
"an instinctive and strong moral aversion to it [retribution] . . . it is
gradually passing away from the moral consciousness of educated
persons in most advanced communities. . . ." But he admitted that
100. H. KELSEN, SOCIETY AND NATURE 52, 55 (1943) W. McCulloch wrote that among
the Koupoules of India "the greatest misconduct is the forgiveness of an injury, the first
virtue, revenge." KELSEN, id. at 64-65. Kelsen says at p. 235 that the retributive principle is
the origin of the idea of causation.
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"it is still perhaps the more ordinary view."'' Even stronger was
Rashdall's condemnation of retribution. For him, "it cannot be ra-
tional to inflict an evil except as a means to good-the good of the
offender or of others."' 10 2
It is not my present purpose to unravel the complexities of the
voluminous literature on "punishment."'0 3 But I should like to sug-
gest a possible way to advance discussion of this subject.
Retribution is a universal phenomenon and experience among
primitive as well as among civilized people, in ancient Greek
drama, in the Old and New Testaments."°4 It is implied or ex-
pressed in every legal system, even in those that explicitly reject it
and then go on to impose punitive sanctions on criminals in propor-
tion to the gravity of the harms they commit. Critics of retributive
justice like Sidgwick and Rashdall believe that all thoughtful per-
sons reject it (pace the heirs of Kant or Hegel-) but they regretfully
acknowledge that "ordinary" people still support it. Even Plato, on
whom Rashdall relied, seems to have made room for it. The plain
fact, like it or not, is that retribution, crude or refined, has been and
is inevitable. Responsibility will vary from collective to individual,
or both may coexist, but retribution is constant. Although many ac-
ademic utilitarians continue to ignore that fact or to argue as though
it can somehow be made to disappear, non-academic utilitarians
simply accept the inevitable and try to minimize its effect when its
manifestation in specific penalties does not further deterrence or
rehabilitation.
The factual inevitability of retribution supports the position I
have long advocated: (1) the primacy of retributive justice on the
ground of desert (guilt) and (2) the advance of the utilitarian ends of
punishment (deterrence and rehabilitation) so far as they do not
trivialize or exceed the limits of justice.°5 The pendulum has swung
sharply in the direction of retributive justice and, unfortunately, in
recent legislation in the United States rehabilitation has been ig-
101. H. SIDGWICK, THE METHODS OF ETHICS 281 (1901).
102. Rashdall, supra note 48, at 421, 422.
103. See Hall, supra note 93, at ch. 9, and consult the Index in J. HALL, LAW, SOCIAL
SCIENCE AND THEORY (1982).
104. Matthew 13: 41-44; 16:27; Mark 9:42.
105. HALL, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 130 (1st ed. 1947). 307-308 (2nd.
ed. 1960). This was not a discovery or a novelty. In 1797 Kant wrote: "He must first be
found to be deserving of punishment before any consideration is given to the utility of this
punishment for himself or for his fellow citizens." I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS
OF JUSTICE 100 (J. Ladd trans. 1965).
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nored or rejected. Religion can remind us of the importance of help-
ing wrongdoers develop an appreciation of moral values. Especially
suggestive are modem versions of the legal and the anti-legal inter-
pretations of atonement. What the philosopher-king will do in Uto-
pia or God in heaven is a matter of faith. So far as the secular
problems of crime and punishment are concerned, legal scholars
will agree that sound positive law has great value. Still it seems
necessary to stress the fact that even the soundest penal law limits
what can be achieved in reliance solely on it. In all world religions
much emphasis is placed on the reform of wrongdoers, thought of as
turning them from evil to goodness or as their advance in knowl-
edge and understanding. There can be little doubt that this aspect
of religion has inspired the reform of penal institutions and much
concern for the rehabilitation of their inmates.

